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I. INTRODUCTION
A response to the interesting comment by Professors Gordon and Korn-
hauser' seems appropriate, not so much because the observations it con-
tains about A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail' are contro-
versial, as because it presents a valuable opportunity to make more
general observations about the nature of the current debate in corporate
law concerning the proper role of target management confronted with a
hostile takeover bid.' Comparing the Gordon and Kornhauser comment
with the Macey and McChesney article illustrates that the overarching
difference between the two sides of this debate is not simply that they
come up with different answers to the same questions. Rather, the differ-
ence stems from our vastly different scholarly agendas. Our article and
their comment represent opposing genres of legal scholarship, which ac-
counts for Gordon and Kornhauser's dissatisfaction with A Theoretical
Model of Corporate Greenmail.
t Associate Professor Emory University School of Law. A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Yale
University. Visiting Associate Professor, University of Virginia. I thank Saul Levmore for helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Unfortunately, conflicting travel schedules and other commitments pre-
vented Professor McChesney and me from producing a joint reply to the Comment by Professors
Gordon and Kornhauser. The Yale Law Journal graciously permitted us to file separate replies.
Having read McChesney's paper, I now concur with his observations and incorporate them by refer-
ence into my own reply.
1. Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE LJ.
295 (1986).
2. Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13
(1985).
3. On one view, management should be prohibited from taking action that would either increase
the acquisition costs of the initial bidder or lower the probability of the initial bidder's success in the
attempted acquisition. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions
and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982); Schwartz, Search Theory and the
Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 1986). Under the competing view, incum-
bent management should be allowed to resist defensive tactics, but only to the extent necessary to
facilitate the creation of an auction market for the firm's shares. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv.
819 (1981).
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This reply will show that the difference in our scholarly agendas is
attributable to a fundamental disagreement concerning the necessity for
regulation to replace the contractual nexus that forms the underpinnings
of the modern corporation. The difference between our article and their
comment is profound indeed-perhaps even more profound than Gordon
and Kornhauser recognize-and ought not be mistaken for a mere dispute
about the legal propriety of a particular defensive tactic in tender offer
contests.
By emphasizing the difference between our approaches, I am not sug-
gesting that the form of discourse we employ is somehow better than
Gordon and Kornhauser's, only that it is different. The difference must be
stressed, however, so that the two sides do not continue to talk past each
other.
II. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO GREENMAIL-OURS AND THEIRS
Gordon and Kornhauser's approach to corporate law identifies a "prob-
lem" (the payment of greenmail), and then seeks to provide a "solution"
(banning the practice). By contrast, our approach does not assume that
practices such as greenmail are problems. Instead, it more modestly as-
sumes that such practices are phenomena, albeit controversial ones, that
need to be better understood. The issue of whether, much less how, green-
mail ought to be regulated was not really a consideration in our article.
Indeed, the only policy conclusion we reached in our article was that
managerial motivation-the standard often used to test the legality of
greenmail payments-is a poor guide to policy.
Gordon and Kornhauser chastise us for not answering certain questions
about the propriety of paying greenmail. 4 While we find their questions
interesting, we approach the greenmail issue from an entirely different
perspective and ask an entirely different set of questions. It is inappropri-
ate to judge our article using their approach as the standard.
Our article attempted to construct a theoretical model to explain the
emergence of corporate greenmail. Their comment, however, takes our ar-
ticle to be another "here's a problem-here's our solution" law review
paper of the sort judges and lawyers find useful. This false assumption
has led Gordon and Kornhauser to saddle us erroneously with a particu-
lar solution to the greenmail problem.
4. The primary question that we have not answered is why there should be a legal rule permit-
ting the payment of greenmail. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 312. In addition, Gordon
and Kornhauser suggest that we do not clarify our presumption that managers of firms who pay
greenmail are conscientious rather than self-interested. Id. at 312-13. With respect to the second
question, our model of greenmail does not depend on conscientious managers. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 26-28.
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Gordon afid Kornhauser approach the issue from the perspective of a
policymaker attempting to determine whether there should be a general
rule (presumably a statute) absolving managers who pay greenmail from
legal liability. The answer that they ascribe to us is "yes." Gordon and
Kornhauser's basic criticism of our article is that we did not prove our
case for granting pardons to managers who pay greenmail. But we did not
attempt to present a case for managerial pardons in our article; in fact, we
oppose the rule that they claim we advocate.
The only rule we favor is the one that allows shareholders, and thus
markets, to determine when managers should have discretion to authorize
the payment of greenmail.' This position stems from the fact that some
greenmail payments make shareholders better off and others make share-
holders worse off. Any blanket rule either permitting or banning green-
mail payments thus would harm some shareholders.
A. Our Approach: Studied Agnosticism
Our goal in writing our article was to "present[] a more complete the-
ory of greenmail than has yet been attempted and examine[] the explana-
tion of greenmail offered by those who would regulate the practice."' In
developing our theory, we first wanted to summarize the current wisdom
regarding the propriety of such payments.7 Next, we tried to place the
greenmail phenomenon within the context of current legal and economic
theories concerning the desirability of defensive tactics. Finally, we strove
to articulate a coherent theory of greenmail that reconciled the impressive
quantity of empirical data that was available to us.
It is important to recognize what we did not do. First, we did not start
with any assumptions about whether greenmail payments in the aggregate
are good or bad for shareholders. Next-and this is the hallmark of the
mode of discourse that we employed-we approached greenmail as an ec-
onomic phenomenon in need of explanation rather than as a social prob-
lem in need of correction. We attempted to explain what initially inter-
ested us in the greenmail phenomenon, namely, how shareholders might
on average benefit from the payment of greenmail.
Because our theory led us to conclude that there are many different
reasons why firms pay greenmail, we were not able to formulate a legal
5. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 60 ("When evaluating greenmail payments, courts
should focus first on whether the managers who paid greenmail violated any express or implied agree-
ment not to make such payments.").
6. Id. at 15.
7. Id. at 14. For a summary that appeared after our article, see Note, Greenmail, Targeted Stock
Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1985); cf.
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 311-12 (describing "standard account" of greenmail
phenomenon).
344
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test for evaluating greenmail payments. In fact, we found that sometimes
target managers who pay greenmail for the "right" reasons (such as creat-
ing an auction market) may end up losing shareholders' money, while
target managers who pay greenmail for the "wrong" reasons (such as try-
ing to hold onto their jobs) may end up creating wealth for shareholders.'
While we did not formulate a legal test to be used in evaluating individual
greenmail payments, our model suggested what questions such a test
would address" and allowed us to evaluate the test currently used by
courts to determine the legality of greenmail payments.10
At the time we wrote our article, several empirical studies of the green-
mail process showed that shareholders whose firms paid greenmail en-
joyed statistically significant gains of approximately two percent.1" In
other words, the studies showed that greenmail led in the aggregate to
gains for shareholders. The empirical evidence also showed that greenmail
payments sometimes benefitted but sometimes harmed the shareholders of
paying firms.12 Yet, while financial economists had amassed an impressive
array of empirical studies about greenmail, they had made only limited
attempts to develop a theoretical framework to explain the data. We at-
tempted to provide this missing theoretical framework. The only theory
that existed before we wrote our article posited that agency costs ex-
plained all greenmail payments.'3 In our article we observed that this the-
ory explained but a fraction of observed greenmail payments." To ex-
plain the rest, we articulated a theory of how greenmail payments could
enhance shareholder welfare. 5 Our theory did not purport to explain all
greenmail payments. Rather, it explained why the payment of greenmail
is a net positive event for the shareholders of many firms. The burden is
hence on those who favor regulating greenmail to develop a means of de-
8. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 42-43, 57-59.
9. Initially such a test would address how any proposed legal rule could improve upon the intra-
firm contracts that firms themselves could adopt. Since any hard and fast rule restricting greenmail
would harm shareholders, the best regulation would be a default rule allowing shareholders to "opt
out" of the statutory rule and enact the rule they prefer. See id. at 58 & n.163. Most important, any
legal test should draw upon the experiences of firms that have been involved in the greenmail process.
10. Id. at 50-61.
11. These studies started from the point at which the greenmailer initially purchased target firm's
stock, ended with the payment of greenmail itself, and controlled for events that might have affected
share prices. Holderness & Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Inves-
tors, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 555, 571-72 (1985); Mikkelson & Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the
Interfirm Equity Investment Process, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 523, 540 (1985) (Table 7); Poulson, Market
Reaction to Corporate Raiders As Individuals (1984) (unpublished manuscript written under Office
of Chief Economist of Securities Exchange Commission).
12. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 43-48 (summarizing empirical analyses).
13. Id. at 38-40. The agency cost explanation of greenmail is also known as the "managerial
entrenchment hypothesis." Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Re-
purchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (1983).
14. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 41-43.
15. Id. at 47.
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termining ex ante which greenmail payments are likely to increase firm
value and which are not.
B. Their Approach: Regulatory Presumption
Gordon and Kornhauser believe that research and writing about green-
mail should focus on the question "how should policymakers distinguish
tactics that will increase shareholder wealth and those that will not?"16
Their undertaking suggests that greenmail can be explained, as well as
evaluated from a policy perspective. But the claim that there is a "poli-
cymaker's dilemma"17 regarding greenmail begs the underlying question
whether greenmail should be regulated in the first place. Given the avail-
able empirical evidence, the need to ask this question becomes a matter of
some significance. Gordon and Kornhauser assume that every innovation
in corporate governance presents a "problem" to be regulated. They thus
place far more confidence in the outcomes generated by the regulatory
process than McChesney and L8 For us regulation is a last resort. Partic-
ularly within the context of the publicly held firm, the available evidence
suggests to us that the contracting process within the corporation-even in
the face of the agency cost shibboleth-is the starting place for answering
the question whether firms should be permitted to pay greenmail.1 9
Gordon and Kornhauser reveal their approach to legal scholarship in
the conclusion of their comment where they opine that "[tihe poli-
cymaker's dilemma is that she cannot wait until the completion of a fully
developed model of a controversial transaction or practice before deciding
how to respond." 20 This assumption-that the policymaker cannot wait
until the market has run its ugly course-separates their approach from
ours. In the introduction to A Theoretical Model of Corporate Greenmail,
we identified ourselves with a much different school of legal writing when
we stated that
an inability to explain certain aspects of exchanges among freely
contracting parties does not necessarily mean that the exchanges
16. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 297.
17. Id. at 320-21.
18. For further elaboration on the views of regulation held by McChesney and myself, see Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial
Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1984); McChesney, Government
Prohibitions on Volunteer Firefighting in 19th Century America: A Property Rights Perspective, 15
J.L. STUD. 69 (1986).
19. As far as I can tell, Gordon and Kornhauser presuppose that firms operate or should operate
under a regime of central planning. Their position seems to be that in the absence of specific rules
permitting transactions such as greenmail, such transactions should be illegal until their merits have
been established.
20. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 320-21.
Vol. 96: 342, 1986
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themselves are socially undesirable. And even if the exchanges harm
some firms, those same transactions may benefit others. Some firms
may wish to restrict use of greenmail for themselves; others may not.
Regulatory or judicial changes that would restrict greenmail across
the board deprive shareholders in at least some firms of a legitimate
means of protecting or advancing their interests in certain
situations."1
We presume that mutually agreed-upon exchanges are likely to benefit
the contracting parties. We expect more "losers" when a transaction is in
its infancy than when those engaging in the transaction are more exper-
ienced. 2' Gordon and Kornhauser apparently do not assign value to this
additional experience; they presume that it is imperative to regulate at
once. By contrast, we find the argument for experience so compelling that
even if the evidence did not show that greenmail payments benefit share-
holders in the aggregate, we would favor waiting before regulating.
Markets seldom operate on the basis of perfect information, particularly
when forced to evaluate transactions like greenmail with which there is
relatively little prior experience. Regulating greenmail payments out of
existence before they are fully understood would prevent market forces
from developing mechanisms for distinguishing greenmail payments that
are beneficial from those that are not. 3
If the market is allowed to operate in this arena, over time shareholders
of different firms may develop a variety of tests to determine when man-
agers may pay greenmail. For example, shareholders might decide to per-
mit greenmail only when an outsider who acquires a "toehold" threatens
to disrupt friendly merger negotiations already in progress. Similarly,
shareholders might decide to permit greenmail only in situations in which
a bidder other than the "greenmailer" expresses a strong interest in the
target firm. Still other shareholders may decide that greenmail can be paid
only when investment bankers or other outside experts conclude that
higher bidders are likely to emerge after such a payment is made. Some or
all of these shareholders might prohibit managers who have paid green-
21. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
22. See I. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 10 (1973) ("The market process,
then, is set in motion by the results of the initial market-ignorance of the participants. The process
itself consists of the systematic plan changes generated by the flow of market information released by
market participation-that is, by testing the plans in the market.").
23. We submit that this difference in approach to issues of corporate governance led Gordon and
Kornhauser to charge us, along with Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, with making "key hidden
assumptions" in our theoretical models. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 297. We must con-
fess to a bit of confusion about the basic point that Gordon and Kornhauser are trying to establish.
Immediately after condemning our work for concealing important assumptions, Gordon and Korn-
hauser applaud the "extremely useful functions" that our model has served in "clarifying assumptions
and forcing deeper analysis" of the issues we discuss. Id. We find it difficult to imagine how we
managed to clarify assumptions by concealing them.
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mail from engaging in defensive tactics for a certain period after the pay-
ment is made in order to maximize the probability that another bidder
will emerge.
The above discussion has suggested various in-house rules that firms
could adopt to minimize harmful greenmail payments and maximize ben-
eficial ones. Gordon and Kornhauser do not even entertain the possibility
that regulators might be able to sift out beneficial greenmail payments
from harmful ones. In this respect, the standards Gordon and Kornhauser
set for policymakers are notably less rigorous than the standards by which
we judge the efficacy of market forces. For a Gordon and Kornhauser
policymaker to be successful, she must simply develop a crude rule which
either permits or prohibits greenmail, depending on whether the gross
number of winners outnumbers the gross number of losers. For an intra-
firm contract to be successful, it must accomplish a good deal more.
Even when given wide latitude in corporate affairs, managers are con-
strained by market forces to act in the interests of shareholders.24 The
wisest course is to study the costs and benefits of new economic phenom-
ena carefully before deciding whether or how to regulate them.
C. The Role of Chance and Self-Interested Management
We also disagree profoundly with Gordon and Kornhauser about the
role of luck in providing wealth to shareholders. Gordon and Kornhauser
complain that shareholders often benefit from greenmail payments
"strictly by chance."' They suggest that "[iln a certain number of cases
. . . self-interested management may simply be wrong in its unfavorable
assessment of the likelihood of a third party bid. ' 26 Specifically, they envi-
sion a scenario in which incumbent management is faced with ouster in a
hostile takeover attempt by a first bidder who has acquired a substantial
minority block of shares. The managers, desperate to hold onto their jobs,
pay greenmail to this bidder in the mistaken belief that no other bidder
will emerge. Subsequently, much to the chagrin of incumbent manage-
ment, another bidder does make an offer at a substantial premium. Share-
holders benefit only because target management happened to make a mis-
take in its assessment of whether a third bidder would emerge.
Gordon and Kornhauser find this situation deplorable. But as we
pointed out in our article, it is doubtful that shareholders would agree.'7
Investors are unlikely to be particularly concerned with target manage-
24. The evidence is superbly catalogued in Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors'
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 540 (1984).
25. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 320.
26. Id.
27. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 42.
Vol. 96: 342, 1986
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ment's motivations for paying greenmail as long as the payments result in
gains for the investors. Furthermore, unlike Gordon and Kornhauser, we
believe that chance and guesswork are standard features of a market pro-
cess, especially at an early stage of evolution Far from deplorable, chance
is vital to the development of a competitive economic system.28 The pre-
mature regulation advocated by Gordon and Kornhauser threatens to sti-
fle innovation and retard economic growth.2 '
Gordon and Kornhauser also charge us with "mak[ing] key hidden as-
sumptions."30 Specifically, they say that we assume that management
must have more favorable and more accurate beliefs than the acquiror
about the prospects of a third party bid if greenmail payments are to ben-
efit shareholders."1 In fact, as pointed out above, we assume the opposite.
We actually share Gordon and Kornhauser's assumption that greenmail is
often paid by target firm managers who seek to rid themselves of a worri-
some suitor and doubt that another bidder will emerge. If this assumption
is true, the uncontrovertible fact is that incumbent management often is
wrong in this estimation. Higher bidders often appear after management
pays greenmail.3 2 Yet in our model, greenmail can benefit shareholders
when the beliefs of faithless managers are less favorable and less accurate,
and when the beliefs of faithful managers are more favorable as well as
more accurate, than those of the acquiror.
28. See Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. PoL. ECON. 211, 214-17
(1950).
29. See I. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 125 (1985).
30. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 297; see also supra note 23.
31. Id. at 315-16. Gordon and Kornhauser erroneously claim that our model assumes that the
bidder makes a two-tier, front-loaded tender offer. Id. at 300. As is clear from our theory, and as we
took pains to point out in our article, our model does not require that a bidder make a two-tiered
offer:
Even without two-tier bids, greenmail is still of value to target shareholders whenever addi-
tional time following an initial offer facilitates the development of an auction for their shares.
For example, in an all-or-nothing bid the offeror generally conditions her offer on receiving a
certain percentage of the outstanding shares by a certain date. This decreases the likelihood of
subsequent bidders trumping the initial offer. Under such circumstances, greenmail may be a
useful device for "buying time" to see if better offers develop.
Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 20 n.31.
Gordon and Kornhauser also erroneously claim that our model assumes no financial intermediaries.
In fact, we neither implicitly nor explicitly make this assumption, as it is not relevant to our theory.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27; see also Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 41
(giving theoretical reasons why greenmail is likely to encourage subsequent bidders); MIKKELSON &
RUBACK, TARGETED REPURCHASES AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS 3 (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Working Paper No. 1707-86, June, 1986) (within three years following greenmail, about
30% of repurchasing firms are taken over; by contrast, frequency of control change for firms that do
not pay greenmail is only about 10%).
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D. The Role of Empirical Evidence
Gordon and Kornhauser's genre of legal writing places a heavy burden
of persuasion on those who do not favor regulation. From their perspec-
tive, if opponents of regulation can point only to empirical evidence cou-
pled with some economic theories about how greenmail benefits share-
holders by facilitating an auction market for their shares, nothing should
stop the regulators from wading into the morass to restore order. In their
view, "[ilf chance elements predominate, then no legal rule is likely to
identify ex ante desirable greenmail payments. We are tempted at this
point to favor a rule proscribing greenmail entirely.""3 Here we find the
gulf between Gordon and Kornhauser and ourselves at its widest. Their
presumption in favor of regulation permits them to ignore scientific evi-
dence that we consider highly relevant. From the outset we considered two
empirical studies, one by Mikkelson and Ruback 4 and the other by Hold-
erness and Sheehan," central to our inquiry. These were the only un-
flawed studies of the entire greenmail sequence; 6 both found statistically
significant gains to shareholders from such payments. For us, any theory
of greenmail must be consistent with this data to be acceptable at the
threshold.
By contrast, Gordon and Kornhauser ignore the data except where they
appear to misunderstand it.87 For them, two facts trump the empirical
evidence that greenmail benefits shareholders. The first is that greenmail
harms at least some shareholders. The second is that the motives of target
managers who pay greenmail seem to be nefarious.
These facts are less important to us than to Gordon and Kornhauser for
several reasons. First, as we explain above, we believe that over time mar-
ket forces are likely to generate better solutions to problematic greenmail
payments than the forces of regulation. Second, our reliance on market
solutions leads us to expect economic actors, including managers, to act
self-interestedly. Thus we are unconcerned that greenmail is often paid
for selfish reasons. Indeed, much of modern financial economics is devoted
to explaining how markets transform managerial self-interestedness into
firm profits. The successful business enterprise is the one that fashions
rules of internal corporate governance that align shareholder interests
33. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 320.
34. See Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 11, at 539-40.
35. See Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 11, at 571-72.
36. Only one study of the entire greenmail sequence concludes that greenmail harms shareholders.
The study is discussed in detail in Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 45-47. For a discussion of
the methodological shortcomings of the other studies, see id. at 43-44 (criticizing time frame), 45-48
(criticizing attribution to greemail of losses due to interim exogenous events).
37. Gordon and Kornhauser claim that "[t]he evidence shows that greenmail leads, in the aggre-
gate, to shareholder welfare losses." Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 320.
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with management interests. McChesney and I were attempting to eluci-
date this principle. Gordon and Kornhauser believe that regulation must
be used to force managers to act in the shareholders' interests. This ap-
proach creates a scholarly agenda whose quest for answers is far more
urgent than ours.
III. CONCLUSION
We concluded our article on what we thought to be a rather humble
note. We stated that "[w]e have not proven that greenmail is always
'good,' simply that it need not be 'bad.' "38 Our view has not changed. We
believe that regulatory proposals to ban or curtail greenmail are contrary
to the best interests of shareholders. In our article, we condemned recent
developments in the judicial application of the business judgment rule in
contests for corporate control.39 Judges now seem to scrutinize the motives
of managers who engage in defensive tactics more closely than in the past.
In our view, despite its shortcomings, the business judgment rule as tradi-
tionally applied provides the best guide for judges to evaluate the payment
of greenmail.' 0 In a nutshell, our theory "counsels against hasty revision
of the law.' 14
I wish to emphasize this last point in closing. The difference between
Gordon and Kornhauser's approach and ours is only partially attributable
to the fact that Gordon and Kornhauser have a general bias in favor of
regulation, while we have a bias against it. We reject the very existence of
the immediate "policymaker's dilemma" that drives their approach to
problems of corporate governance. Postponing regulation of new phenom-
ena such as greenmail until analysts have had the opportunity to gather
and examine the relevant data is imperative. In addition, contracting par-
ties should have an opportunity to craft private solutions to phenomena
that initially appear negative.
Regulators would be more successful if they abandoned the notion that
there is a policymaker's dilemma that forces them to regulate before the
"completion of a fully developed model of a controversial transaction or
practice."' 42 One of the reasons that this is an exciting time to apply law
38. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 60.
39. Id. at 55-60.
40. The most obvious shortcoming of the traditional business judgment rule is its use of manage-
rial motivation to evaluate the legality of greenmail. Specifically, under the traditional formulation of
the rule, judges prohibit greenmail if impermissible motives are the sole or primary reason for the
payment. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964). In practice, however,
this test does not serve as a constraint on managers' ability to pay greenmail. Macey & McChesney,
supra note 2, at 60.
41. Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 61.
42. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 321.
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and economics to the study of corporate law is that many common and
well-established patterns of corporate behavior are imperfectly understood.
Basic topics, such as dividend policy,"3 share repurchases44 and optimal
capital structure,45are only now being explained adequately in the litera-
ture. Gordon and Kornhauser suggest that the explanations are obvious
and intuitive, and hence that regulators can easily find answers to ques-
tions which long have befuddled shareholders and market participants. On
closer inspection, however, the world is substantially more complex and
uncertain than Gordon and Kornhauser presume. Their quest for an im-
mediate solution to the policymaker's dilemma is at best quixotic.
43. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 650 (1984).
44. Dann, Common Stock Repurchases, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 113 (1981); Masulis, Stock Repurchases
by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock Price Changes, 35 J. FIN. 305 (1980).
45. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, .3 J. FIN. E(:oN. 305 (1976).
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